Linguistics by Joseph, John
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Linguistics
Citation for published version:
Joseph, J 2017, Linguistics. in M Bevir (ed.), Modernism in the Social Sciences: Anglo-American
Exchanges, c.1918–1980. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 182-201.
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Modernism in the Social Sciences
Publisher Rights Statement:
This material has been published in Modernism and the Social Sciences: Anglo-American Exchanges,
c.1918–1980, edited by Mark Bevir. This version is free to view and download for personal use only. Not for re-
distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works.
©Cambridge University Press 2017.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 09. May. 2018
1 
 
Linguistics 
John E. Joseph 
University of Edinburgh 
 
 
1 Modernity and modernism in the study of language 
Linguistics, like sociology, wears its modernity on its name tag. The term Linguistik is first attested in 
German in the eighteenth century, then in French as linguistique (1812), and in English as linguistics 
in 1837,1 but it took decades to catch on as the designation of an academic field. Most of the early 
attestations come from American publications, including the writings of the man who is in some 
respects the first “modern” linguist, William Dwight Whitney (1827-1894), in the 1860s and 1870s.2 
In institutional terms, the Société de Linguistique de Paris was founded in 1864,3 but university 
chairs in linguistics were slow to be established in France or any other country. The Linguistic Society 
of America was founded in 1924, almost seventy years after its French counterpart, and it would 
take another thirty-five years for the founding of the Linguistic Association of Great Britain in 1959. 
Linguistics was particularly slow to develop in countries such as the UK where language study 
remained strongly rooted in the older tradition of philology. 
What distinguished linguistics from earlier approaches? No single criterion, but a constellation. 
Unlike philology, it was not bound up with the interpretation of classical or medieval texts; unlike 
etymology, its principal concern was not the origin of particular words; unlike the grammaire 
générale tradition of seventeenth and eighteenth century France (later to be revived by Noam 
Chomsky), it was not linked to enquiries into logic; unlike the pedagogical grammar tradition it was 
not aimed directly at the teaching of the standard language or of classical or modern foreign 
languages. At the same time, the proponents of modern linguistics did not cut their ties with these 
more venerable enterprises, but instead asserted dominion over them, based on a claim of scientific 
authority. This they staked largely on redefining their object of study as the language conceived as a 
self-contained system, which they approached without value judgements about what aspects of it 
might be reckoned good or bad.4  
                                                          
1
 See James Turner, Philology: The Forgotten Origins of the Modern Humanities (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2014), p. 146, who gives the first English attestation as from 1839, being unaware of Anon., ” 
“History of Navigation in the South Seas” (review), North American Review, vol. 45, no. 97, Oct. 1837, 361-390. 
2
 See William Dwight Whitney, Language and the Study of Language: Twelve Lectures on the Principles of 
Linguistic Science (New York: C. Scribner & Co.; London: Trübner, 1867), The Life and Growth of Language: An 
Outline of Linguistic Science (New York: D. C. Appleton & Co; London: Henry S. King, 1875); Stephen G. Alter, 
William Dwight Whitney and the Science of Language (Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2005); John E. Joseph, From Whitney to Chomsky: Essays in the History of American Linguistics (Amsterdam & 
Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2002). 
3
 Two earlier Sociétés de Linguistique had been founded, one in 1837 about which little is known, and a second 
in 1854, headed by Casimir Henricy and disbanded in 1860. 
4
 For every instance of usage purported to be bad, because illogical, a linguist will cite examples from a range 
of the world’s languages in which the same structure is treated as perfectly logical. The double negative, for 
example, is scorned as illogical in English (I don’t have nothing), but is the only way to form a negative 
sentence in Italian (Non ho niente). To challenge linguists on this would be to paint oneself into the pre-
modernist corner of having to assert absurdly that Italians, as a people, are illogical. 
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Methodologically modern linguistics was to be descriptive rather than prescriptive, and by the 1950s 
the consensus among its practitioners was that “All languages are equally complex.”5 This is the sort 
of dogmatic assertion that not only defies empirical investigation into its veracity, but would close 
investigation down altogether. Its rise becomes understandable when we look back to how 
commonly authors of accounts of “exotic” languages from the sixteenth until the early twentieth 
century treated structures that differed from the familiar Indo-European ones as fundamentally 
illogical. Either the exotic structure appeared more economical than that of the European languages, 
in which case the language and its speakers were labelled as underdeveloped, or the structure 
codified some distinction which European grammars do not make, in which case the languages and 
their speakers were described as quaint at best, and at worst, wasteful of mental energy. Either 
served to characterize them as primitive and inferior.6 
If rejecting such beliefs, while reorienting attention away from many of the areas covered by 
traditional philology and adopting a rigorous form of systematic analysis, stamped linguistics with 
methodological modernism early on, it took another century for forms of aesthetic modernism to 
mark the field.7 This happened principally through reactions to the vision of language set forth in the 
Cours de linguistique générale (Course in General Linguistics), published in 1916, based on three 
courses of lectures given by Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) between 1907 and 1911.8 
 
2 Dramatis personae 
The Cours had its distribution limited by shipping disruptions caused by the Great War. Apart from 
Russia, where it was picked up quickly by the Formalists, including the young Roman Jakobson 
(1896-1982),9 only after the publication of its second edition in 1922 did it become the cornerstone 
of an enduring modernism in the study of language, in both continental Europe and the USA.  
The UK resisted. Britain had already undergone its methodologically modernist turn in the study of 
language with the work of the phoneticians Henry Sweet (1845-1912), a reader at Oxford, and Daniel 
Jones (1881-1967), who in 1921 was appointed to a Chair of Phonetics in the University of London. 
                                                          
5
 See John E. Joseph & Frederick J. Newmeyer, “‘All Languages Are Equally Complex’: The Rise and Fall of a 
Consensus,” Historiographia Linguistica 39/3 (2012), 341-368. 
6
 See Matthew Lauzon, Signs of Light: French and British Theories of Linguistic Communication, 1648-1789 
(Ithaca, NY & London: Cornell University Press, 2010). 
7
 On the manifold problems of the “modern” see Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, transl. by 
Catherine Porter (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), and John E. Joseph, “The Wolf in Itself: 
The Uses of Enchantment in the Development of Modern Linguistics,” The Making of the Humanities, Vol. 3: 
The Modern Humanities, ed. by Rens Bod, Jaap Maat & Thijs Weststeijn (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University 
Press; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 81-95.  
8
 Ferdinand de Saussure, Cours de linguistique générale. Publié par Charles Bally & Albert Sechehaye avec la 
collaboration d’Albert Riedlinger (Paris & Lausanne: Payot, 1916). 2nd ed. 1922; annotated ed. by Tullio De 
Mauro, 1972, critical ed. by Rudolf Engler 1967-74. English trans., Course in General Linguistics, by Wade 
Baskin, New York: Philosophical Library, 1959; another by Roy Harris, London: Duckworth; La Salle, Ill.: Open 
Court, 1983. 
9
 See Frederic Jameson, The Prison-House of Language: A Critical Account of Structuralism and Russian 
Formalism (Princeton, NJ & London: Princeton University Press, 1974); John E. Joseph, Nigel Love, & Talbot J. 
Taylor, “Jakobson and Structrualism,” Chap. 2 (pp. 17-28) of Landmarks in Linguistic Thought II: The Western 
Tradition in the Twentieth Century (London & New York: Routledge, 2001). 
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As discussed below, one of Saussure’s fundamental concepts became central to Jones’s work, but as 
a phonetician his interest was limited to the sound level of language. Two of the lecturers whom he 
hired were however more devoted Saussureans: Harold E. Palmer (1877-1949), a practitioner of 
what would later be called applied linguistics;10 and later, J. R. Firth (1890-1960), destined to become 
the most important British linguist of the twentieth century. At Cambridge, meanwhile, notice was 
taken of the Cours by two rather marginal figures, C. K. Ogden (1889-1957) and I. A. Richards (1893-
1979), but only in order to reject its approach out of hand, for reasons to be explained below. 
In the USA, on the other hand, the Cours seemed to be of a kindred spirit with the distributional 
method developed for the analysis of American Indian languages by the German émigré 
anthropologist Franz Boas (1858-1942) and published in its definitive form in 1911.11 It was well 
received both by Edward Sapir (1884-1939), the first among Boas’s linguistic students, and Leonard 
Bloomfield (1887-1949), who came from the historical linguistics tradition.12 Bloomfield would go on 
to do his own fieldwork on American Indian languages, and he and Sapir would establish themselves 
as the pre-eminent American linguists of the interwar period. Each published a widely-read book 
with the title Language, Sapir in 1921, Bloomfield in 1933.13 Of all the books on linguistics published 
in the English language, Bloomfield’s Language had, until the 1960s (and arguably beyond) the best 
claim to being definitive. Bloomfield himself would say in a letter to one of his students that 
Saussure’s influence was to be found “on every page.”14 
I have now introduced my protagonists in the Anglo-American exchanges: Jones and Firth, 
Bloomfield and Sapir; and the two principal antagonists, Ogden and Richards. There remains to be 
mentioned the Anglo-Polish anthropologist Bronisław Malinowski (1884-1942), who wrote an 
appendix to Ogden and Richards’s The Meaning of Meaning.15 Hovering over all, like Old Hamlet, is 
the Genevese ghost of Ferdinand de Saussure. 
 
                                                          
10
 See H. E. Palmer, The Principles of Language-Study (London: Harrap, 1921), p. 78; Richard Smith, “Harold E. 
Palmer’s Alternative ‘Applied Linguistics’,” Histoire–Epistémologie–Langage 33/1 (2011), 53-67. 
11
 Franz Boas, Handbook of American Indian Languages, Part I (Smithsonian Institution, Bureau of American 
Ethnology, Bulletin 40; Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1911). See also Regna Darnell, And 
Along Came Boas: Continuity and Revolution in Americanist Anthropology (Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John 
Benjamins, 1998); and on the separation between British and American linguistics in the period just before the 
one treated in this paper, Julie Tetel Andresen, Linguistics in America 1769-1924 (London & New York: 
Routledge, 1990), especially pp. 1-10. 
12
 From this same tradition had hailed Leonard’s uncle Maurice Bloomfield (1855-1928), who had studied 
alongside Saussure at Leipzig and later served as first president of the Linguistic Society of America. 
13
 Edward Sapir, Language: An Introduction to the Study of Speech (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, 1921); 
Leonard Bloomfield, Language (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1933). Bloomfield had published an 
earlier book, An Introduction to the Study of Language (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1914), which had 
not aimed at theoretical or methodological originality. On Sapir, see also Regna Darnell, Edward Sapir: Linguist, 
Anthropologist, Humanist (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990). 
14
 J Milton Cowan, “The Whimsical Bloomfield,” Historiographia Linguistica 14/1-2 (1987), 23-37. To forestall 
any confusion to which the article’s title may give rise: in 1988 I asked Cowan, the recipient of the letter in 
question, whether Bloomfield might have been in “whimsical” mode when making the comment about 
Saussure’s influence. Cowan, who knew Bloomfield well, was certain that it was made in earnest. 
15
 Bronisław Malinowski, “The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages,” supplement (pp. 451-510) to C. K. 
Ogden & I. A. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning: A Study of the Influence of Language upon Thought and of 
the Science of Symbolism (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.; New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1923). 
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3 Saussure and the modernism of the Cours de linguistique générale 
Saussure himself was an unconventional figure in many respects.16 He became famous as a linguist 
when, shortly after his twenty-first birthday and before having received any academic degree, he 
published his Mémoire on the primitive vowel system in the Indo-European languages.17 This book 
proposed a radical rethink of the reconstructed vowel system of the original Indo-European mother 
language, before its speakers undertook the Völkerwanderung that would leave them spread them 
from the easternmost frontier of Slavic and Indic-speaking Asia to the westernmost coastal reaches 
of Celtic and Romance-speaking Europe. 
The message of the Mémoire was: Forget uniformitarianism, the methodological stricture that 
forbids positing entities or processes in the past for which no direct counterparts are observable in 
the present. Consider not what the prehistoric vowels sounded like, but how the sound system 
functioned, qua system. That was an important first step in the modernist direction – aesthetic as 
well as methodological – of what, fifty years later, would start to be called structuralism. That 
happened long after Saussure’s death: he never used the term. In fact, for the rest of his life he 
would never publish anything nearly so ambitious or so attention-getting as the Mémoire; as noted 
above, the Cours was posthumously assembled and issued. 
For his doctoral thesis from the University of Leipzig, he chose a much more limited topic, a 
particular structure (the genitive absolute) in a single language, Sanskrit.18 In the course of his 
research he found it increasingly difficult to sweep under the rug the sort of thing that lies beneath 
every linguist’s rug: the failure of forms and meanings to match up in a perfectly systematic way. 
Previous grammars of Sanskrit had assumed that the genitive absolute construction must have come 
about in connection with the basic meaning of the genitive case, viz. possession. But this required 
some fancy footwork to explain, since the Sanskrit genitive absolute construction, like the Latin 
ablative absolute, had no obvious link to possession, instead expressing “in spite of.” It appeared to 
Saussure that nothing inherent to the genitive endings led them to be used in this way. Rather, 
simply their difference in form from other case endings sufficed to signal this particular usage.  
That would become another cornerstone of his conception of what a language is: a system of 
differences. To put it more fully, a system in which every element is a value derived from its 
difference vis-à-vis every other element. Over the thirty-three years of his career after the 
doctorate, Saussure published some two dozen articles, all of them historical linguistic studies. He 
wrote but never published material on “synchronic” matters, his conception of how a language 
system operates at a given point in time. The reason he did not publish any of this material was not 
that linguistics was not yet ready for his modernist conception – it may well have been – but that 
Saussure himself was crippled by a perfectionism so severe that nothing he wrote on the subject 
could meet his self-imposed standards of logical consistency and verbal clarity. 
He did however include synchronic aspects of language in his lectures, starting already in Paris in the 
1880s, where he was employed to teach Gothic and Old High German at the École Pratique des 
                                                          
16
 See John E. Joseph, Saussure (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
17
 Ferdinand de Saussure, Mémoire sur le système primitif des voyelles indo-européennes (Leipzig: printed by B. 
G. Teubner, 1879).  
18
 Ferdinand de Saussure, De l’emploi du génitif absolu en sanscrit (Genève: Imprimerie Jules-Guillaume Fick, 
1881). 
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Hautes Études. In 1891 he left Paris to return home, taking up a Chair of Sanskrit and the History and 
Comparison of Indo-European Languages at the University of Geneva. Sixteen years later he was 
given the additional responsibility of lecturing on general linguistics, following the retirement of a 
colleague. Saussure did not think much of general linguistics as a subject, believing that its principles 
were best learned by studying texts in a particular language in depth. Struggling to find appropriate 
subject matter for his lectures, he dug out, and gradually expanded, his old ideas on the synchronic 
functioning of language systems. When the Cours was published in 1916 it was these ideas that 
made the greatest impact. 
The Cours is often said to have replaced nineteenth-century historical inquiry with the synchronic 
analysis of present-day languages. This is partly inaccurate: Saussure did indeed want to reform 
historical linguistics, by reorienting it toward a “diachronic” approach (his neologism) that would 
look at language evolution not in terms of atomistic elements changing through time, but as a series 
of complete systems in which, at any given time (synchronically), every element is connected to 
every other. At each stage, the language is a socially-shared system of signs, where each sign is an 
arbitrary but inseparable conjunction of two mental elements, an acoustic image (or “signifier”) and 
a concept (or “signified”) – though here Saussure was not claiming to teach anything new, just 
repeating aspects of the grammaire générale tradition that he himself had been taught in the 
schools of Geneva in the 1870s. Again, each signifier and each signified was a value derived from its 
difference vis-à-vis every other signifier and signified with which it existed in a paradigmatic or 
syntagmatic relationship. This idea, fundamental to British associationist psychology,19 was known to 
Saussure through various sources, but its particular importance for language was driven home to 
him through his analysis of the Sanskrit genitive absolute, as explained above. 
The historical linguistics which Saussure believed needed reforming had reached its pinnacle of 
scientific éclat with the “Neogrammarian manifesto” published by two lecturers at the University of 
Leipzig, Brugmann and Osthoff, shortly before Saussure’s arrival there as a student in the autumn of 
1876.20 Theirs was a developmental historicism in which the evolution of languages, “insofar as it is 
mechanical,” as they put it, was to be explained by sound changes which followed “laws” so 
powerful that they admitted of no exceptions. Of course, an escape clause was already built in 
through the “insofar as it is mechanical”: for some changes were not mechanical, but occurred 
through the drawing of analogies, which demanded a semi-conscious mental process (rather than 
just the acoustic and articulatory processes that drove mechanical change). 
 
4 Reducing meaning: Jones 
In the study of language, we do not have to look far to find an empirical approach that arose as a 
methdologically modernist alternative to developmental historicism.21 Advances in sound recording 
made great strides possible in phonetics, that study of the acoustics and articulation of speech 
                                                          
19
 See John E. Joseph, Language, Mind and Body: A Conceptual History (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2016). 
20
 Hermann Osthoff & Karl Brugman, preface to Morphologische Untersuchungen auf dem Gebiete der 
indogermanischen Sprachen 1 (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1878), iii–xx. Despite the order of names Brugmann (as he 
later spelled his surname) was the lead author. 
21
 See Mark Bevir, “Political Studies as Narrative and Science, 1880-2000,” Political Studies 54 (2006), 583-606. 
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sounds which Saussure had advocated keeping out of historical inquiry in favor of working out the 
mental system by which the elements of language were organized in the speaker’s mind. This is not 
to say that Saussure was against phonetics: he knew the literature and made use of phonetic insights 
when it suited his argumentative purposes. But he thought that phonetics had its own place in the 
understanding of speech, parole, which should not be confused with that of phonology, the study of 
mental sound systems, which pertained to the study of language, langue. Paris became the centre 
for the study of phonetics, along with Henry Sweet’s Oxford, and soon followed by Marburg in 
Germany, a number of Scandinavian universities, and then, with Jones, London. 
The diachronic approach as envisioned by Saussure offered an alternative “linguistic” modernism to 
acoustical-articulatory phonetic “speech” modernism. Indeed, sorting out the distinction between 
language and speech (langue, langage, parole) is one of the first tasks undertaken in the Cours, 
along with clarifying the roles of diachronic and synchronic inquiry. For Saussure, speech is the 
utterances we produce through the socially-shared, mental system of language. Recording and 
analysing utterances can tell us a great deal about speech, but not directly about language, which it 
is the first business of linguistics to comprehend. In a way, Saussure’s linguistics is a hybrid between 
the developmental historicism represented by earlier Neogrammarian historical linguistics, and the 
modernist empiricism represented by the new acoustical-articulatory phonetics, which had been 
established as the modern approach to language study in Britain in the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century. Especially significant in this regard was the work of Sweet, who combined 
traditional historical philology with an intense interest in the description of the sounds of English, in 
part for the applied purposes of language teaching. After Sweet’s death, Jones assumed the mantle 
of Britain’s leading phonetician. He was appointed to a chair at the University of London in 1921. At 
the more conservative Oxford, Sweet had never risen above the rank of reader. 
Jones took up a key concept that Saussure had used in his Mémoire: that of phonemes, the sound-
units that constitute one level of the language system. Jones played a key role in refining the 
concept of the phoneme into its later, definitive form, as the minimal sound-unit capable of 
distinguishing meaning in a language.22 But as a phonetician Jones was not inclined to follow 
Saussure in imagining the phoneme as having, like any signifier, a purely mental reality. Instead, 
Jones linked phonemes to a sort of idealized articulation, most famously with his “cardinal vowels,” 
a concept-cum-technique of pronouncing vowels at their extreme limits to try to define their space 
and capture their essence.  
Jones’s work was greatly respected in American universities, but its importance seemed more 
marginal than in Britain. At least since the advent of universal education in the 1860s and 1870s, 
American linguistic education had been more grammar-oriented, where British linguistic education 
was more pronunciation-oriented. In both countries, social class was indexed and performed 
through one’s consonants and vowels and intonation patterns, less consciously and perhaps 
therefore more powerfully than through grammar and vocabulary. But it mattered less in America, 
just because social class boundaries were that much more permeable.  
                                                          
22
 His crowning work was Daniel Jones, The Phoneme: Its Nature and Use (Cambridge: W. Heffer & Son, 1950), 
though his reputation had been established decades earlier with numerous articles and books, of which the 
most widely known was An Outline of English Phonetics (Leipzig & Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1918), surprisingly 
published in Germany during the war, though from the second edition of 1922 on by Heffer in Cambridge. 
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Jones’s work was always class-coded just beneath the surface, in a linguistic space that had 
developed an ever more precise class coding over the course of the long nineteenth century. The 
American linguists, led by Sapir and Bloomfield, inhabited a linguistic space in which the coding was 
more sensitive to class mobility, to massive immigration, and of course to race, in a period of overt 
segregation in the South and more subtle segregation in the North. British people heard in each 
other’s vowels whether their ancestors had come before or after 1066 and whether they had paid 
fiefs or received them. Americans heard where they or their parents had come from, which also gave 
away their religious or sectarian affiliations; and in their grammar, they heard how far they had gone 
in their schooling. That atmosphere was perhaps more receptive to the concept of the sound system 
as meaning-based.  
In any case, working out the exact nature of the phoneme was at the core of the debate among 
American linguists for some four decades. Behind it lay another, even more fundamental debate, 
about the nature of meaning itself. Each of the linguists discussed here was compelled, with the 
impetus to be modern, to find a route out of the “meaning trap,” by which I mean the weight of 
expectation that they as scholars of language would contribute to what has always been the great 
problem of language: pinning down what words and texts really mean, in the face of the all too 
apparent reality of ambiguity and conflicting interpretation. Saussure’s route had been to distill 
meaning down to just signification, which was the linguist’s business, leaving it to philosophers and 
psychologists to deal with how signs relate to things or ideas. Jones likewise declined to be 
concerned with matters of reference; but rather than offer a theory of signs, he would simply not 
acknowledge that meaning was problematic.  
 
5 Mechanizing meaning: Bloomfield 
Arguments about meaning had begun opening a way into linguistic and philosophical modernism in 
the pre-War period, when a key Anglo-American exchange took place between Victoria Lady Welby 
(1837-1912), founder of Significs, and Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), whose theory of semiotics 
was developed and transmitted mainly through his correspondence with Welby.23 She was present 
too at the birth of analytic philosophy at Cambridge, acting as a gadfly to Bertrand Russell (1872-
1970), and mentor to the young C. K. Ogden.24 But Russell, and eventually Ogden, became frustrated 
in part with her lack of modernity – hardly surprising, since she was thirty-five years older than 
Russell and fifty-two years older than Ogden, and given too the only partly hidden religious impetus 
behind her work. Still, hers was a rational religiosity, making it more scientifically palatable than 
what was widely perceived as the crypto-mysticism of Freudian psychoanalysis. 
A few years after Welby’s death in 1912 an epistemological and methodological revolution, or rather 
schism, took place in psychology and other empirically based human sciences about the possibility of 
                                                          
23
 See Semiotic and Significs: The Correspondence between Charles S. Peirce and Victoria Lady Welby, ed. by 
Charles S. Hardwick (Bloomington & London: Indiana University Press, 1977); Susan Petrilli, Signifying and 
Understanding: Reading the Works of Victoria Welby and the Significs Movement (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 
2009); and John E. Joseph, “Meaning in the Margins: Victoria Lady Welby and Significs,” Times Literary 
Supplement no. 5686 (23 March 2012), 14-15. 
24
 See James McElvenny, Meaning in the Age of Modernism: C. K. Ogden and His Contemporaries, PhD thesis, 
University of Sydney, Department of English, 2013. 
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knowing the thoughts of another person. The behaviorism of John B. Watson (1878-1958) seems by 
biographical accounts to have had an anti-religious impetus, a rejection of his strict Southern Baptist 
upbringing.25 It was counter-Freudian in its rejection of anything “mental,” where Freud, on the 
contrary, multiplied the minds an individual possesses. Yet, on the other hand, both Watson and 
Freud were on the trail of the animal nature of man, in Watson’s case taking inspiration from Pavlov 
and other animal psychologists. Just as phonetics represented the nec plus ultra of empiricism in the 
study of speech, behaviorism did the same in the study of human action.  
Bloomfield was the first linguist to take behaviorism seriously, starting, as it happens, with his 1923 
review of Saussure’s Cours.26 Here he reinterpreted Saussure’s signifiers as “signals,” and in an 
article of 1927 he would complete the reinterpretation by suggesting that Saussure should have 
dispensed with signifier and signified altogether and spoken instead of stimulus and response.27 I 
have discussed elsewhere how useful this sort of “misreading” is as evidence of the epistemological 
stance of a reader such as Bloomfield;28 it is though not altogether clear whether Bloomfield was 
trying to say that Saussure ought to have been a behaviorist, or really was one deep down: a 
behaviorist manqué. In any case, the core of Bloomfield’s linguistic behaviorism was its rejection of 
anything mentalistic. To analyse language in terms of mental categories was, for Bloomfield, to enter 
into metaphysics, and modern science had to confine itself to the physical, or as Bloomfield 
preferred to put it, the mechanical. For Bloomfield, linguistic signification needed to be analysed in 
terms of observable actions or things that stimulate a person to speak; the utterance itself; and the 
observable actions that occur in response to the utterance.  
Adherents of mentalistic psychology believe that they can avoid the difficulty of 
defining meanings, because they believe that, prior to the utterance of a linguistic 
form, there occurs within the speaker a non-physical process, a thought, concept, 
image, feeling, act of will, or the like, and that the hearer, likewise, upon receiving the 
sound-waves, goes through an equivalent or correlated mental process... For the 
mentalist, language is the expression of ideas, feelings, or volitions. 
The mechanist does not accept this solution. He believes that mental images, 
feelings, and the like are merely popular terms for various bodily movements […].29 
Bloomfield did not refuse entirely to speak about meaning, as some later neo-Bloomfieldians tried to 
do. But his behaviorist commitments constrained how far he could elaborate the meaning of 
“meaning” as traditionally understood, and that it was the assumed goal of linguistic analysis to pin 
down. Meaning remained central to Bloomfield’s method, as the criterion for identifying phonemes, 
but as a matter of pure difference – which is probably what he meant in saying that Saussure’s 
influence is on every page of Language. Bloomfield, like Saussure, did not try to analyse what 
meaning is, beyond the internal link of a signifier and a signified, each identified through difference 
from every other of the same type. 
                                                          
25
 See Kerry W. Buckley, Mechanical Man: John Broadus Watson and the Beginnings of Behaviorism (New York: 
Guilford Press, 1989). 
26
 Leonard Bloomfield, rev. of Saussure, Cours de linguistique générale (2
nd
 ed.), Modern Language Journal 8 
(1923), 317-319. 
27
 Leonard Bloomfield, “On Recent Work in General Linguistics,” Modern Philology 25 (1927), 211-230. 
28
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6 Culturalizing meaning: Sapir 
In the same year as Bloomfield reviewed the Cours, Sapir reviewed The Meaning of Meaning by 
Ogden and Richards.30 He was able to read it with particular devotion, during a summer in which he 
was laid up in hospital with a broken leg. His very positive review of the book marks a turning point 
in his views about the relationship of language to thought and culture. In previous work he had 
treated a language as an anthropological key to unlocking the secret recesses of the culture that 
speaks it: “Language is the most massive and inclusive art we know, a mountainous and anonymous 
work of unconscious generations.”31 From this point on his “magic key” outlook will be tempered by 
a distrust of the “metaphysical garbage” embedded in languages, a concern which he took away 
from his reading of Ogden and Richards. For them, all languages are saturated with “word magic” 
that is a residue of their prehistoric, pre-rational origins, and that create obstacles to logical thinking 
for their speakers.  
Every intelligent person knows that words delude as much as they help [...] And yet 
few accept with due cheer and conviction the notorious failure of a given universe of 
speech-symbols, a language, to correspond to the universe of phenomena, physical and 
mental. [...] 
Messrs. Ogden and Richards [...] make it clear, as no philologist has ever quite made 
it clear, why an understanding of the nature of speech is a philosophic essential, why 
every epistemology and every system of logic that does not subject speech, its necessary 
expressive medium, to a searching critique is built upon the sands, is sooner or later 
snared in the irrelevances of the medium.32 
This is the start of the discourse that would become known as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, and it 
represents possibly the most significant AngloAmerican influence in twentieth-century 
linguistics.33 
The impact of The Meaning of Meaning in various branches of thought is coming to be recognized in 
recent work following a long period of relative neglect. Much of the book is historical in nature, with 
Ogden and Richards resuming and reviewing attempts at understanding the nature of meaning in 
language from ancient times onward. When they come to Saussure, they reject his conception of the 
linguistic sign out of hand, treating it as almost perverse for not including referents, things in the 
world that words designate, as part of linguistic signification.  
Unfortunately this theory of signs, by neglecting entirely the things for which signs 
stand, was from the beginning cut off from any contact with scientific methods of 
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verification. De Saussure, however, does not appear to have pursued the matter far 
enough for this defect to become obvious.34 
Under Lady Welby’s tutelage, Ogden had become familiar with Peirce’s semiotics, which, unlike 
Saussure’s semiology, was not intended to be narrowly confined to linguistic signification. That is the 
clearest difference between Peirce and Saussure: where Peirce offers a framework embracing all 
signification and symbolism, visual as well as verbal, Saussure scrupulously declined to pronounce on 
anything outside his field of specialization as a grammarian. The borderline lay squarely between the 
linguistic signified and the referent. Saussure no doubt had his private views on the relationship 
between them, and it may well have been similar to Peirce’s. But the key point for Saussure was 
that, whatever that relationship may be, it does not affect how signification operates within the 
linguistic sign. Whether the referent is an individual such as Queen Victoria, a category such as dog, 
an abstract idea such as justice, an imaginary category such as unicorn, a quality such as white or 
impossible, with each of these linguistic signs, the bond between the signifier and the signified 
remains the same. 
But this is just what Ogden and Richards saw as being so dangerous. Where part of Saussure’s 
modernism was the disconnect between signified and referent, their modernism lay in the ultra-
rationalism of exposing word magic. They regarded the Saussurean disconnect as a surrender to pre-
modern irrationalism. But Ogden and Richards did not really “get” modernism. More precisely, only 
Richards did, which probably had a good deal to do with their eventual split. Ogden, the senior 
partner, quite rightly saw his own work as a throwback to the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham 
(1748-1832) of a hundred years earlier. His anachronistic tastes may have prompted his decision to 
include as a supplement to The Meaning of Meaning Malinowski’s essay on “The Problem of 
Meaning in Primitive Languages.”  
Malinowski introduces such key ideas as context of situation and phatic communion (the use of 
language for purely interpersonal purposes) in the course of making the very modernist argument 
that even the most “civilized” languages are just as run through with purely phatic utterances as the 
Melanesian languages he had studied, if not more so. Ogden read this as an exposé of word magic in 
the spirit of the rest of the book. But modernist anthropologists read it differently: not as a call to rid 
European languages of phatic verbiage, but a celebration of how we are not and never will be the 
purely rational and utilitarian creatures Bentham-Ogden imagined. We are much more than that. It 
is unsurprising that this appendix, received as ground-breaking and daring, stole the thunder from a 
book that otherwise felt more than a bit stodgy. 
The selections from Sapir’s music and poetry criticism included in his Selected Writings show us a 
man attuned to the art being created around him, but not art reflecting the modernist aesthetic, of 
which he seems unaware.35 He had studied musical composition with the American Romantic 
composer Edward MacDowell (1860-1908), and the poetry he wrote was reminiscent of the pre-
modernist “Georgians” of the second decade of the twentieth century, whom he admired. Yet his 
appreciation of Native American cultures was unreserved, and gives him some claim to modernism, 
particularly with his article “The Psychological Reality of Phonemes,” the very title of which was a 
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thinly-veiled challenge to Bloomfield.36 In it Sapir gives accounts of cases where he, as the “expert” 
observer, made phonological analyses which he was later persuaded to change by informants who 
were themselves insiders to the culture he was studying. They had a strong intuitive sense of what 
was the “same” sound on the mental-phonological level of the phoneme, even though that 
phoneme might sound different depending on what preceded or followed it.37 For Sapir, the cultural 
insider has an expertise which trumps the modern scientist’s empirical observational power.38 That 
extends all the way down to the “meaning” by which phonemes are determined. 
 
7 Complexifying meaning: Firth 
The linguist who latched most immediately onto Malinowski’s framework was J. R. Firth, for whom 
context of situation became the key concept in a revisionary approach to meaning that made his 
linguistics distinctive. It also contributed to the difficulties others had in comprehending it. For Firth, 
Saussure was headed in the right direction, but his project needed to be pushed further. Linguistic 
meaning is not determined by things in the world – but more than that, even signification within the 
linguistic sign is context-dependent. A language is indeed a system in which everything connects to 
everything else – but more than that, it is a polysystem, a system of systems, levels, layers that need 
to be analysed separately despite being fully interlocked.  
After WWII, Firth’s elevation from lecturer in Daniel Jones’s department to occupying the first chair 
of linguistics in the UK began a schism-cum-rivalry between the two, considerably more intense than 
that between Sapir and Bloomfield. Firth’s determination to create a linguistics that was 
methodologically modernist drew him to Malinowski, while his equally strong determination to 
create an original approach of his own led him to resist ideas from across the Atlantic. Direct 
resistance can itself constitute an exchange of sorts. R. E. Asher, who studied under both Jones and 
Firth, says that Firth was very conscious of differentiating his linguistics from American linguistics, 
and that he was the kind of man who took pains to make clear that he was widely read yet had 
something original to offer.39 Asher recalls him speaking rarely of American linguistics, but often of 
continental linguistics, with Saussure coming up in nearly every lecture. 
In 1950 Firth wrote that “Nowadays, professional linguists can almost be classified by using the 
name of de Saussure. There are various possible groupings: Saussureans, anti-Saussureans, post-
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Saussureans, or non-Saussureans.”40 He considered Saussure’s conception of langue to contain 
certain fundamental errors, two of which were that it abstracted the language system away from 
context, and that it located it in the mind of the speaker (“psychological structuralism”). Firth strived 
toward a concept of language as something located not within people (whether as individuals or 
social groups), but within what people do, the context of situation, borrowing Malinowski’s term. 
Unlike pragmaticians such as J. L. Austin, who saw language as inseparable from the actions people 
perform, Firth did think of language as something apart, a particular “form of human living” (close to 
Wittgenstein’s late view of language as a Lebensform, a “form of life”) that needed to be analysed in 
its own terms, though never separately from the context in which it occurred.41 
Jones’s work, with its treatment of meaning as something unproblematic that phonemes could 
differentiate, was readily absorbed by American linguists. Even if they shunted his cardinal vowels 
aside as not useful for their purposes, they embraced the International Phonetic Alphabet project, in 
conjunction with which he had developed the cardinal vowels. Firth, on the other hand, seemed 
impenetrable. He had published two introductory books on linguistics which were elementary when 
compared with those of Sapir and Bloomfield,42 and had embarked on a series of papers in which he 
presented his polysystemic complexifications briefly and sketchily. Only those who had studied 
directly with Firth appeared to understand them fully and appreciate their import, and they 
invariably came away considering Firth a genius. His essential difference vis-à-vis Jones, Bloomfield, 
and Sapir was that, where they strove to find the simplest solution to the problems posed by 
language, Firth started from the assumption that language is a massively complex phenomenon, and 
that its analysis was bound to reflect and embody that complexity.  
He was invited to take part in the Linguistic Society of America’s semi-annual Linguistic Institute in 
the summer of 1948, and that ought to have been the occasion for the mid-century Anglo-American 
exchange that could have set linguistics on a markedly different track for the second half of the 
century. But it was not a success: the ground had not been well enough prepared, Firth was not 
given enough time to develop his lectures fully and explain (if he himself actually realized it) that his 
whole epistemological aesthetic, as it were, was based on the opposite set of assumptions from the 
American one. The American linguists, students of Sapir’s until his death in 1939, then students of 
Bloomfield’s, went away shaking their heads in incomprehension.43 One of those students, Rulon 
Wells (1919-2008), had recently published the first analysis of Saussure’s Cours by an American 
linguist since Bloomfield’s review.44 Another student, Zellig Harris, went on to direct the doctoral 
thesis of Noam Chomsky, whose work would, starting in the early 1960s, spur on the next great 
revolution over the linguistic treatment of meaning, while simultaneously reversing the tide of what 
had until then been mainly AngloAmerican influence. 
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8 Aftermath and conclusion 
Chomsky famously went to war against the behaviorism of the preceding generation, taking as his 
proxy target not a linguist but a psychologist, B. F. Skinner, who had created the opportunity for 
Chomsky by publishing a book entitled Verbal Behavior.45 That Skinner’s approach to meaning in the 
book is actually closer to Firth’s than to Bloomfield’s comes as a surprise to linguists, who rarely read 
Skinner, mistakenly assuming that they know what his book is about from Chomsky’s review of it. 
The review is really directed against the neo-Bloomfieldian old guard of linguistics, some of whom, 
led by George L. Trager (1906-1992), had tried to push meaning out of linguistic analysis 
completely.46 Where meaning was concerned, Chomsky actually continued Bloomfield’s project of 
mechanizing it, but this time with an overtly mental mechanism: a mental grammar, built upon a 
foundation that is innate and universal, and that serves not only to produce utterances but to assign 
an interpretation to utterances which are heard. Chomsky pointed out that mastery of a language 
also involves “the ability to identity deviant sentences” (7), such as Colorless green ideas sleep 
furiously, and “on occasion, to impose an interpretation on them,” “if a context can be constructed 
in which an interpretation can be imposed.”47 The poet John Hollander famously constructed such a 
context in “Coiled Alizarine (for Noam Chomsky)” (from The Night Mirror, 1971):  
Curiously deep, the slumber of crimson thoughts: 
While breathless, in stodgy viridian, 
Colorless green ideas sleep furiously. 
This is a clear case of imposing an interpretation as Chomsky defines it. But no interpretation needs 
to be imposed on a sentence like Revolutionary new ideas appear infrequently. The speaker’s mental 
grammar assigns it a structural description which indicates that it is perfectly well-formed. 
Interpretation then proceeds automatically out of the mental grammar. 
We thus have two completely different mechanisms of interpretation, one for well-formed and the 
other for deviant sentences. The first is automatic and straightforward: Jonesian. The second is 
complex to the point of being Firthian: the grammar assigns a structural description that indicates 
the manner of its deviation from perfect well-formedness, after which, “an interpretation can often 
be imposed by virtue of formal relations to sentences of the generated language.”48 But the 
interpretation does not follow directly or automatically out of those “formal relations.” If they did, 
the word imposed would not be applicable to them. The interpretation of the well-formed sentence 
is generated by the grammar, but that of the deviant sentence has to be imposed by someone, John 
Hollander for instance. 
With the emergence in the 1960s of Chomsky’s universalism, grounded initially in his reading of 
Saussure though soon looking back atavistically to the eighteenth and eventually the seventeenth 
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centuries,49 more direct conflicts emerged. One of these was with Firth’s disciple M. A. K. Halliday, 
championing a “social semiotic” inspired on one level by Saussure, and on another by Marx.50 But no 
dialogue was possible between Chomsky and Halliday, the Atlantic gap having only widened since 
Firth’s failure to win over the Linguistic Institute in 1948. The much more troublesome conflict for 
Chomsky was the one that opened up between him and the most talented of his own first 
generation of students, the “generative semanticists,” who argued that an account of language must 
start from meaning, where Chomsky’s interpretative semantics insisted that it start from linguistic 
form, off of which meaning is read as explained above.51 It took over a decade for him to recover his 
position as the leading American linguist of the second half of the twentieth century, a position 
which however he never relinquished, at least until the century ended. 
Halliday and his many influential students have carried on the Firthian tradition, mostly outside the 
USA, under the names of Systemic Functional Linguistics and Critical Discourse Analysis. The latter 
intersects with post-structuralist and radical historicist approaches that mainstream linguistics, a 
very conservative field, has succeeded in keeping marginalized. In the longer term, I believe, the field 
has paid the price for not heeding these critiques. If Bevir (2006) poses as the essential question for 
political studies, “How did we get to be so skeptical?,” the equivalent question for linguistics is, 
“How did we fail to be skeptical enough?.” The answer, I suspect, lies in a preoccupation with 
internecine struggles, from Jones vs. Firth to the “linguistics wars” between generative and 
interpretative semanticists that resulted in the solidifying of doctrines into dogma. 
This paper has obviously not attempted a full history of the period, even where the treatment of 
meaning in linguistics is concerned. That would require, for example, bringing in a figure such as 
Stephen Ullmann (1914-1976), whose work paved the way for semantics to re-enter the mainstream 
of British, then of American linguistics.52 It might consider the work of the Oxford philologist J. R. R. 
Tolkien, including his totally anti-modernist project of writing stories in which he claimed to start 
from a name and to let a story unfold from it. This turned everything about the modern analysis of 
meaning on its head – and it eventually turned around the economy of Anglo-American exchanges, if 
we include Tolkien’s novelistic œuvre, grounded in his Germano-Celtic philological learning, as part 
of linguistics broadly conceived.  
Finally, perhaps the closest thing to a genuine Anglo-American exchange occurred with the 
modernist project of creating an international auxiliary language that, unlike the earlier Volapük and 
Esperanto, would be scientifically based. This directly united Sapir, who contributed important 
theoretical work to the project,53 with Ogden and Richards, who had created Basic English as an 
offshoot of The Meaning of Meaning. But Basic English and the larger project it was part of were 
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consigned to the rubbish bin of history following the satirical depiction of Basic English as Newspeak 
by another figure whose place in the history of linguistic thought has been underestimated: George 
Orwell. This I mention with trepidation, for, if Ogden and Basic English represent an anti-modernism 
that harks back to Jeremy Bentham, what does that make Orwell? An anti-anti-modernist who is also 
anti-modernist in his own way? Whatever answers we give to these questions will be tautological, 
since they depend on just how we define modernism – leaving us precisely where we started, with 
the impulse to break through such tautologies with a scientific method for determining linguistic 
meaning. It is a naïve impulse. The only method for making meanings determinate would be, not a 
scientific but a political one, specifically a totalitarian one, Newspeak, which it took Orwell’s 
particular genius to comprehend. 
